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Abstract
This paper demonstrates the variety of institutional arrangements affecting small-
scale fishing in southern Sri Lanka, highlighting legal pluralism and focusing
particularly on its consequences for livelihoods and resource conservation. Evidence
derives from two landing centres in Hambantota District, and is grouped according
to three institutional types: norms, community working rules and state working rules.
The authors argue that these institutions play differential roles in providing access to
fishing, preventing conflict, structuring fishing operations, reducing risks and
conserving resources. Interactions between state and community legal systems
consist of four types - indifference, competition, accommodation and mutual
support. Institutional effectiveness is threatened most where implementation is poor
or rules are in direct competition.
Keywords: Small-scale fisheries; Legal pluralism; Livelihoods; Conservation; State
institutions; Community institutions; Fisheries governance
Introduction
Despite a recognition of their overall importance (FAO 2015) as well as the failure of
current management approaches (Andrew et al. 2007), fisheries scientists note a lack of
data on small-scale fisheries, particularly in developing countries (Kolding et al. 2014). Data
deficiency pertains also to the institutions fishers develop in local contexts, as well as the
way such institutions interact with state law. As Jentoft et al. (2009:35) point out, however,
for South Asian fisheries: “state intervention would, at best, be consistent with and comple-
mentary to local rule but may potentially also be superfluous or even hazardous, as it may
interfere with or eliminate local regulatory systems, with unforeseen consequences for the
moral and institutional fabric of communities.” In view of the various possible effects of
regulatory configurations on small-scale fisheries and the livelihoods of their members, it is
therefore relevant to map the workings of the institutional landscape in various contexts,
while acknowledging their immense diversity (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2015).
This paper maps the institutional landscape of the small-scale fisheries of southern Sri
Lanka, adding to available insights on the sector (Amarasinghe 2006; Bavinck et al. 2013). It
blends an institutional economic approach with insights from the field of legal pluralism.
Scholars in the latter domain argue that many ‘situations’, particularly in developing coun-
tries, are characterized by multiple, overlapping normative systems (von Benda-Beckmann
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2001). In line with recent literature that emphasizes the pervasiveness of legal plural-
ism in the governance of natural resource use (Bavinck and Jyotishi 2014), we distin-
guish state institutions from community institutions. Although there is scattered
evidence of the co-existence of state and non-state institutions for fisheries governance
in Sri Lanka (Amarasinghe and Bavinck 2011; Bavinck et al. 2013), there is a dearth of
specific information on their interaction. We make use of a typology of legal pluralism
to investigate the impact of different modes of legal plural engagement, especially with
regard to livelihoods and resource conservation.
The paper’s first purpose is to further demonstrate the richness of the institutional
landscape in fisheries in southern Sri Lanka. We then determine that state and commu-
nity institutions have parallel but also contradictory impacts on fishing practice, liveli-
hoods and conservation objectives. In line with the argument of Gupta and Bavinck
(2014), we suggest that improving the coherence between the two will enhance the
effectiveness of fisheries governance.
We first present the conceptual approach and the methodology employed (sections
2 and 3), then introduce the fieldwork location and the practice of small-scale fishing
(section 4). Section 5 reviews the wide range of state and community institutions
governing local fishing practice, and organizes their interactions into a typology. Our
analysis focuses on institutions in which there is strong dissonance between state and
community institutions.
Conceptual approach
We define livelihoods as: “the command an individual, family, or other social group has
over an income and/or bundles of resources that can be used or exchanged to satisfy its
needs” (Blaikie et al. 2004). As fishing livelihoods rely on the availability of fish resources,
their sustainability depends also on the health of the marine environment. Fishers generally
engage in fishing not on an individual but on a collective basis, and socio-economic inter-
actions between them are normal. We distinguish interactions within and between working
units, defined as the group associated with a particular craft. Further, we know that in cap-
ture fishing, catches derive from a common pool resource (Ostrom et al. 2012), where indi-
vidual property rights are weak (Ostrom and Hess 2007). In such situations, fishing
populations often create regulatory institutions (Ostrom 1990; Bavinck and Gupta 2014).
Alternatively – or in parallel - the state introduces institutions with an effect on fisheries.
We build on North’s (1991) definition of institutions as any form of constraint devised
to shape human interaction. Bromley (2006:41) describes institutions as “the essential
ordering – the architecture – of our existence”, and argues that they “define realms of
choice for individuals in a going concern” (2006:217). He distinguishes two kinds of insti-
tutions: norms – or behavioural regularities, based on beliefs, moral principles and
normative explanations - and working rules. Working rules are collectively devised deci-
sions that are put to actual use.1 The institutions we discuss are both economic and social
in nature. We have limited ourselves to beach-level institutions that have an immediate
bearing on the practice of fishing.
In the Sri Lankan case, as we shall see below, community institutions are often non-
codified and consist of norms and working rules. State institutions in contrast are generally
codified and laid down in law – needless to say, however, not all codified rules are neces-
sarily implemented. Although state-sponsored cooperative societies have a relatively long
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history in the region, many of these village-based organizations are defunct. They have not
assumed a significant role in fisheries governance, limiting themselves largely to the
provision of credit and welfare (Amarasinghe and Bavinck 2011).
We argue that institutions related to fishing livelihoods in Sri Lanka derive from both
fishing communities and the state. This condition is referred to as legal pluralism
(Tamanaha et al. 2012; Bavinck and Gupta 2014). Efficiency of enforcement of these in-
stitutions can be calculated on the basis of transaction costs, or the costs incurred in
ensuring compliance (North 1990). The costs of compliance and the efficiencies of en-
forcement are inversely related.
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) make a division between access rights and extraction
rights. Institutions provide shape to such rights in local settings (Wickramasinghe
2010). Institutions first of all provide access to the fishery, defining right holders from
non-right holders. They also provide structure to fishing operations and reduce the in-
cidence of conflicts within and between working units (Pascual-Fernandez et al. 2005).
Conflicts within working units may arise during fishing operations, in the preparation
thereof (such as with regard to the repair of fishing gear), and after fishing has taken
place (such as with regard to the sharing of proceeds). Conflicts between working
units occur with regard to the allocation of beach space in a landing center, the com-
petition for fishing grounds, or the incidence of negative gear interactions.
Institutions can reduce the risks inherent to fishing, and raise as well as stabilize in-
comes (Wickramasinghe 2010). Finally, they can have long-term community benefits,
such as by reducing the impact of fishing on the marine environment. In summary, in-
stitutions may have six important effects:
i. Higher incomes for right holders,
ii. The stabilizing of incomes over time,
iii. Conflict reduction (conflicts otherwise creating transaction costs),
iv. Reduced risk to life and equipment,
v. Benefits to other members of the communities to which fishers belong, and, or
vi. Benefits to the marine environment and the plant and animal life it contains.
It must be noted that common pool resource institutions may also have negative ef-
fects, and that these are often caused by political dynamics (Agrawal 2003). Thus, in-
stitutions may benefit some and exclude others, generating elite capture and
marginalizing the poor. Although we recognize the possibility of institutional bias, this
has not been our research angle, and it is left aside.
We define resource conservation in a limited sense as a reduction of extraction to
prevent overexploitation (Baland and Platteau 1996) and recognize that it can have a
positive livelihood impact on small-scale fishers in future but may result in costs in the
present. As such, attention for livelihoods and conservation combine in the notion of
sustainable livelihoods as promoted by the Brundtland Commission (WCED 1987).
Methodology
Data collection
Data collection took place over the period of a full calendar year (2006) in the context of a
PhD research project in social economics by the first author (Wickramasinghe 2010). The
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second author has a long history of socio-economic research on fisheries in South Asia
and specializes in legal pluralism and governance. It is to be noted that the research period
coincided largely with the post-tsunami phase of rehabilitation in Sri Lanka, and that this af-
fected results in various ways. First, government institutions were probably in more disarray
then than they are normally. Secondly, since the field research took place, Hambantota dis-
trict has been subjected to rapid development, with major infrastructural works (airport and
harbor) having been undertaken. It is possible, although not very likely, that this has
impacted the institutional landscape in small-scale fisheries.
The PhD research project concentrated on the small-scale, motorized and non-
motorized boat fisheries of Hambantota District in southern Sri Lanka, and did not
look at the beach seine fishery and the semi-industrial, multi-day fishery which takes
place in the same area (Alexander 1995 [1982]; Amarasinghe 2006). Small-scale fishing
is defined as operations practiced in inshore waters (up to 30 km distance from shore),
making use of small fishing craft and relatively simple, mainly stationary gear.
Aiming for in-depth knowledge of beach-level institutions and the way they affect fish-
ing practice, the researchers focused on two adjacent landing centres - Kalametiya and
Welipatanwila – which were demonstrated in a pre-study to be representative of small-
scale fisheries in the district (Wickramasinghe 2010). The research sample included 85
skippers2 of whom 64 were from Kalametiya and 21 from Welipatanwila. Qualitative data
included information on types of fishing practice and fisher institutions, fisher compliance
with institutions, and fishers’ attitudes towards institutions.
Fisher institutions were identified through participant observation and informal discus-
sions at the landing sites, and subsequently verified with respondents. All institutions but
one proved to be present in both locations. We then categorized institutions on the basis
of our understanding of the theoretical literature. State institutions that relate to small-
scale fisheries were investigated through the study of relevant documents and interviews
with personnel of the Department of the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (for details see:
Wickramasinghe 2010). Participant observation, informal discussions and a structured
questionnaire were used to identify fisher compliance with both sets of institutions.
Location and fishing practices
According to the Coastal Zone Management Plan of Sri Lanka, Hambantota District pos-
sesses different coastal habitats such as coral reefs, estuaries, lagoons, mangroves, sea grass
beds, salt marshes, barrier beaches, spits and dunes (CCD 2003). Hambantota comes
under the Fisheries Administrative Division of Tangalle and counts 53 fishing villages. The
total number of active fishers in the district is approximately 7,000 (Amarasinghe and
Bavinck 2011) who landed 27,320 MT of fish in 2012 (NARA 2012). Craft types in small-
scale fishing vary from non-motorized outriggers (Sinhalese: oru), to motorized fiberglass
boats. The gear types used by fishers include various types of gill nets, hand lines, long-
lines, cast nets, and small purse seines.
Fishers operating in Kalametiya landing center are from three Grama Niladhari
divisions – Bata Atha South, Gurupokuna and Hathagala. These divisions include
approximately 1000 fisher households (Personal communication). All fishers are
Buddhist by religion and of the Sinhala ethnicity. Kalametiya is situated about 4
km from the Matara-Tissa main road, and is an important landing centre where
different types of fishing gears are used. Bounded by large rocks to the east and
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west, the geo-physical features of the beach are favorable to year round fishing op-
erations. Beach space, however, is limited, and there is a considerable crowding of
craft (Plate 1). Although small-scale fishing is the main source of livelihood for
most households, additional sources of income include signing on as a crew mem-
ber on a semi-industrial fishing boat for deep sea fishing, repairing nets, selling
fish and various other non-fishing activities. Before the tsunami of 2004, the num-
ber of small-scale craft at this landing site was as follows: 45 sail powered outrig-
gers, 5 outboard-engine powered outriggers, 65 outboard engine powered fiberglass
boats and 10 vessels with inboard engines. After the tsunami, the number of out-
board engined fiberglass boats increased by twenty as the fishers with outriggers
obtained fiberglass boats as tsunami aid. The main fishing season here is from
March 15 to September 15 (warakan season). There are two fishing cooperative so-
cieties in Guropokuna and Batatha South GN division. Both provide credit and
welfare facilities but are otherwise not involved in fishing.
In contrast to the sheltered nature of Kalametiya, the Welipatanwila landing site is rela-
tively long and unprotected (Plate 2). The river Walawe, which enters the sea here, and
the proximity of mangrove forests, however, have a favorable impact on marine resources.
The landing site is used by approximately 400 Sinhala Buddhist fisher households from
Welipatanwila village, which is located about 1.5 km away. Fishing is the main source of
livelihood of these households, although supplementary income derives from migratory
fishing, enlisting as a crew member on a semi-industrial vessel, repairing nets and other
land-based activities. Before the tsunami of 2004, there were 51 crafts at the landing site,
including 46 outriggers and 5 outboard engine powered fiberglass boats. After the
tsunami, this number increased to 80 crafts (75 outriggers and 5 fiberglass boats with out-
board engines). It must be noted, however, that not all these crafts were being operated.
The main fishing period in Welipatanwila is from September 15 to March 15 (harahakan
season). The two fishing cooperative societies are more or less dormant.
Gillnets of different types – the most prevalent of which are sardine nets (Hurulla
dela), scad nets (Bolla deala), lobster nets (Pokirissa dela) and frigate tuna nets
Plate 1 Kalamatiya landing centre
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(Alagodu dela) - constitute the most popular fishing gears in Hambantota district. In
Kalametiya landing centre, sardine nets, scad nets, lobster nets and frigate tuna nets
are owned by respectively 69, 56, 55 and 42 % of the interviewed fishers respectively.
In Welipatanwila landing centre, sardine nets, scad nets, lobster nets and trammel
nets are owned by 95, 86, 70 and 83 % of the interviewed fishers respectively. In
addition, fishers in the two landing centres use various longlines, named according
to their target species (such as bottom set rock fish longline – baby lone, bottom set
trevally longline – para lone and drift tuna long line – Kelewalla lone).
Craft and gear in both locations are generally owned by the skipper. In some
cases, the owner does not engage in fishing and a skipper is then recruited. The
crew generally consists of two persons. Returns from fishing are divided according
to share systems that take account of investments, operational costs, and labor in-
puts (see the Appendix to this paper for more details). Important fish species in
Kalametiya are yellow fin tuna (Thunnus albacores), big eyed tuna (Thunnus
obesus), Indian scad (Decapterus ruselli), frigate tuna (Anxis thazard) and spotted
sardinella (Amblygaster sirm) while those in Welipatanwila landing centre are white
sardinella (Sardinella albella), Indian scad (Decapterus ruselli), skate/ray (Raja
djiddensis) fish and spotted sardinella (Amblygaster sirm). Annual fish landings in
Kalametiya are bigger (estimated 340 MT in 2006) than those in Welipatanwila (esti-
mated 23 MT).
Institutions in small-scale fishing
Table 1 presents an overview of the institutions identified in the research sites, di-
vided into two categories according to their origin (community or state), and then
again as to their institutional type (norms and working rules). We do not pretend to
be comprehensive – rather, our intention is to highlight variety. In addition, we have
not been able to identify changes over time. A few observations are in order. First,
some institutions are internal to the working unit, while others structure relations
between working units or have a more general bearing (also affecting other kinds of
Plate 2 Welipatanwila landing centre
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Table 1 Institutions in small-scale fisheries
Institutions (Community) Enforcement Scope Identified purpose
Norms Self-enforcement
1c Land-based and sea-based conflicts are kept
separate - fishers at sea don’t avenge issues
that happened on shore and vice versa.
Yes Within/between working units Reduction of risk of conflict in fishing and
increased harmony of the fishing community
2c Crew members participate in repairing the
gear used on their fishing craft.
Yes Within working units Reduction of cost of fishing and increase of
trust between craft owner and crew members.
3c Reciprocity of assistance at the landing site
for launching or landing craft and preparing
gear for next voyage.
Yes General Fishers and helpers enjoy mutual benefits.
Fishers do not face labor shortages and
helpers obtain some fish in return.
4c Respect for private property: fishers don’t steal
or damage others’ fishing gear left unattended
at sea or at the landing center.
Yes General This behavior reduces the risk of losing
gear thereby reducing the cost of fishing.
5c Non-fishing on the weekly Buddhist holiday
(poya day) identified through a lunar calendar.
Yes General Though this rule has a religious base, its
social and economic impacts include the
maintenance of social relations, opportunities
to participate in village meetings, but also
the loss of fishing income.
6c Prohibition on catching or landing turtles. Yes General Catching or even touching turtles is
believed to bring bad luck. Compare
rule 17 s. This norm supports the
state rule prohibiting the catching of turtles.
Working rules Community Enforcement
7c Share arrangements of catch that vary according
to the ownership of fishing gears, the type of
fishing, and the type of gears and craft
Yes Within working units These ‘contracts’ define shares and generate
trust between owner and crew members.
They also dispense with uncertainty of
the division of returns to their assets.
8c Restricting access to the landing site to villagers:
only the fishers belonging to a particular
landing center are to fish in adjacent waters.
Yes General This rule protects the fishing rights
of local users and helps prevent















Table 1 Institutions in small-scale fisheries (Continued)
9c Fixed landing spots for craft: every craft
occupies a particular space at a landing center.
Yes General Every fisher of a particular landing center knows that
he has a particular space at the landing center for
leaving his craft and gears. This confirms a fisher’s
right to fish and minimizes possible conflicts.
10c First come, first serve on the fishing ground. Yes Between working units This rule prevents possible conflicts and disputes
between fishers at sea.
11c Maintaining a minimum distance (approx. 200 m)
between working units using gillnets at sea.
Yes Between working units Assuring equal chances of obtaining catches
and minimizing conflict.
12c Prohibition of catching lobster with scuba
diving equipment
Yes General Fishers prohibit equipment that is not generally
affordable and provides some with more
opportunities than others.
13c Prohibition of targeting chank (Turbinella pyrum) Yes General Chank fishing is practiced with scuba diving
gear and is therefore doubly prohibited
(see working rule 12c).
14c Ban of gillnets to catch Koramburu
(Herklotsichthys quadrimaculatus).
Mixed General Koramburu is said to be a timid schooling
species that is targeted by specialized
hook-and-line fishers. If this species is
confronted with standing nets, it flees
an area. This working rule protects one
fishing practice against another.
Institutions (state) – Codified Working rules State Enforcement
15 s Licensing of fishing operations, codified in the
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act, No. 2
of 1996, Article-6.
Not in the post-tsunami period. General This rule in principle provides officers
with an instrument to regulate the
volume and type of fishing
operations carried out in an area.
16 s Registration of craft, codified in the Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources Act, No. 2 of 1996,
Article-15.
Not in the post-tsunami period. General Similar to rule 15 s.
17 s Prohibition of catching marine mammals and
turtles, codified in the Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources Act, No. 2 of 1996, Gazette No-948/25.
Yes. Coincides partially with rule 6c. General This rule is enforced by the Department















Table 1 Institutions in small-scale fisheries (Continued)
18 s Prohibition of using bottom-set nets on reefs,
codified in the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
Act, No. 2 of 1996, Gazette No-948/25.
Most fishers violate this rule and there
is no state enforcement.
General This regulation is to prevent destruction of
the benthic environment (corals).
19 s Prohibition of explosives or poison,
codified in the Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources Act, No. 2 of 1996, Article-27.
Yes. No fishers in the two villages uses explosives
or poisons for fishing, because this rule is strictly
enforced by officers of the Fisheries Department
and the police.
General Explosives or poison are destructive fishing methods,
20s Prohibition of collection/mining of corals,
codified in the Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources Act, No. 2 of 1996, Article-37.
Yes. Some poor fisher families in the research
area were previously mining corals. This rule
is being strictly enforced.
General This is considered a destructive of the marine environment.
21 s.1* Need for permit to catch, possess, exhibit
for sale, sell or transport spiny lobster
and slipper lobster.
No. Fishers do not take permission for
catching or selling these lobster species.
General Safeguarding sustainability of lobster stock.
21 s.2* Banning of lobster fishing in the months
of February and September.
Yes. This is enforced by closing the lobster market. General Safeguarding sustainability of lobster stock.
21 s.3* Banning the catching of under-sized lobsters
(carapace < 6 cm or tail length < 10 cm).
No. Fishers do not follow this rule and it
is not implemented.
General Safeguarding sustainability of lobster stock.
21 s.4* Banning the catching of berried females No. Fishers catch and remove eggs before selling. General Safeguarding sustainability of lobster stock.
21 s.5* Requirement of a permit for possession,
exhibiting for sale, selling or transport
of lobsters
Yes. This rule is for buyers and traders. Buyers
and traders in the two landing centers do
have these permits.
General Safeguarding sustainability of lobster stock.















fisheries, or community life in general). This is discussed in Table 1 under the head-
ing of ‘scope’. Second, it is clear that state and community institutions have different
ambits. State institutions generally focus on conservation issues. Sometimes the pur-
pose of conservation appears to be the sustainability of the fisheries themselves
(thereby tying into a livelihood function), but there are other motives as well (sup-
port for other sectors such as coastal tourism, conservation of biodiversity for the
country or humanity as a whole). Community institutions are concerned with alloca-
tion and sustainability, but also with maximizing the economic performance of fish-
eries and reducing the fishers’ physical risks.
Third, there are important discrepancies in the enforcement of various institutions,
with transaction costs being a major factor. Community norms are generally self-
enforcing, whereas community working rules are implemented by the collective of
fishers through social pressure on the beach or at sea. Penalization of transgressions
takes place through exclusion from community activities. Transaction costs in these
cases are generally limited because community members monitor others’ activities
while they engage in fishing themselves. Therefore, there is no need to incur add-
itional time or material costs. State institutions are less effective. Some institutions
are not enforced at all because the transaction costs for doing so are prohibitive.
Others – such as the prohibition for the use of poisons and explosives - are enforced
because of their interface with other government concerns, such as security. The
interaction between state and community institutions is also a factor influencing en-
forcement, as will be explained below.
The aggregate of 21 norms and working rules presented in Table 1 allow for four
conclusions:
1. Out of the 14 community institutions, 13 (more than 92 %) are fully enforced and
only one (14c) has a mixed record of enforcement.
2. Out of seven state institutions, three (17 s, 19 s and 20s) were enforced and a
similar number (15 s, 16 s. 18 s) were not enforced at the time of research.
Non-enforcement was partially related to the period of chaos that followed the
2004 tsunami (rules 15 s and 16 s). In other cases, it was due to a lack of
enforcement capacity (rule 18 s and 21 s.1, 3–5).
3. Out of the set of community institutions, five are applicable within or between
working units while others are applicable to the collective of fishers.
4. All state institutions are applicable to the collective of fishers.
We now organize the various institutions according to their function and their
beneficiaries (see Table 2). The following two observations are in order: (a) although
an institution often possesses a direct function, there are indirect functions too; (b)
therefore, beneficiaries of a particular institution may be identified as direct or indir-
ect beneficiaries.
Eight functions are distinguished. It is interesting to note that community institu-
tions monopolize the function of preventing conflict, and dominate the function of
achieving an increase of fishing income. State institutions aimed at environmental
protection are, on the other hand, more numerous. However, their effectiveness is
very limited.
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Table 2 Institutions according to function and beneficiaries
Function Institution* Identified beneficiaries
Providing access to
the fishery and to
fishing space
Restricting access to the
landing site to villagers (8c)
Fishers belonging to the landing centre
Fixed landing sites for crafts (9c) Fishers of the respective landing centre
Licensing of fishing operations (15 s) Government officers in charge of regulating
fisheries, and – in principle – the population
of marine fishers in the country. Local fishers
do not consider this rule to be legitimate.
Registration of craft (16 s) Government officers in charge of regulating
fisheries, and – in principle – the population
of marine fishers in the country. Local fishers




in repairing gear (2c)
Both crew members and owners of
fishing gears.
Non-fishing on weekly poya day (5c) Fishers who abide by this rule (avoiding
religious sanction), and the general
population of fishers (as non-fishing
contributes to resource conservation).
No catching or landing of
marine turtles (6c)
Fishers who want to avoid bad luck.
Maintaining a minimum distance
between working units (11c)
Fishers who engage in fishing with nets.
Licensing of fishing operations (15 s) Government officers in charge of regulating
fisheries, and – in principle – the population
of marine fishers in the country. Local fishers
do not consider this rule to be legitimate.
Registration of craft (16 s) Government officers in charge of regulating
fisheries, and – in principle – the population
of marine fishers in the country. Local fishers
do not consider this rule to be legitimate.
Reducing (likelihood
of) conflict
Conflicts on the land are not to be
taken to the sea and vice versa (1c)
All Fishers of a landing centre
Restricting access to the landing
site to villagers (8c)
Fishers belong to a particular landing centre
Fixed landing sites for crafts (9c) Fishers of a landing centre
First come, first serve on the
fishing ground (10c)
Fishers who come first to a fishing ground.
Maintaining a minimum distance
between working units (11c)
Fisher who set their nets first.
Reducing risk Respect for private property (4c) All fishers of a landing centre
Share arrangements of catch (7c) Both crew members and owners of craft
Licensing of fishing operations (15 s) Owners of fishing gears because in a future
disaster, fishers can claim for any damage to
their gears. (The government has taken a
decision to provide new gears for only
licensed gears damaged by a disaster).
No bottom-set nets on reefs (18 s) All fishers as this rule contribute to reduction
of fish habitat destruction and conservation
of fish resource
No explosives or poison (19 s) All fishers
Raising income Crew members participate
in repairing gear (2c)
Both crew members and owner
of fishing gear
Reciprocity of assistance at
landing site (3c)
Fishers and helpers
Respect for private property (4c) All fishers
First come, first serve on the
fishing ground (10c)
Fishers who come first to a fishing ground
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Table 2 Institutions according to function and beneficiaries (Continued)
Maintaining a minimum distance
between working units (11c)
Fisher who set their nets first.
Prohibition of catching lobster with
scuba diving equipment (12c)
Fishers who cannot afford to engage
in scuba fishing
Prohibition of targeting chank (13c) All fishers generally and especially those
who engage in lobster fishing (as persons
engage in chank fishing with scuba
diving equipment also catch lobsters).
No use of nets to catch
Koramburu fish (14c)
Oru fishers who depend on hook and
line fishing.




Prohibition of catching lobster
with scuba diving equipment (12c)
Fishers who cannot afford to engage in
scuba fishing
Prohibition of targeting chank (13c) All fishers generally and especially those
who engage in lobster fishing (as persons
engage in chank fishing with scuba
diving equipment also catch lobsters).
Licensing of fishing operations (15 s) Owners of fishing gears because in a future
disaster, fishers can claim for any damage
to their gears. (The government has taken
a decision to provide new gears for only
licensed gears damaged by a disaster).
No bottom-set nets on reefs (18 s) All fishers as this rule contributes to
reduction of fish habitat destruction
and conservation of fish resource.
No explosives or poison (19 s) All fishers
Benefits human life/
wider community





Non-fishing on weekly poya day (5c) Fishers who comply with this rule.
Prohibition of catching lobster
with scuba diving equipment (12c)
All lobster fishers not using scuba equipment
Prohibition of targeting chank (13c) All fishers generally and especially those
who engage in lobster fishing as persons
who engage in chank fishing with scuba
diving equipment also catch lobsters.
No use of nets to catch
Koramburu fish (14c)
Traditional craft fishers
Licensing of fishing operations (15 s) All fishers benefit in principle from a
healthy ecosystem.
Registration of craft (16 s) All fishers benefit in principle from a
healthy ecosystem.
Prohibition of catching marine
mammals and turtles (17 s)
General public concerned with the
conservation of marine mammals and turtles
No bottom-set nets on reefs (18 s) All fishers due to reduction of threat
to the benthic environment
No explosives or poison (19 s) All fishers due to reduction of threat to
the fish resource
No collection/mining of corals [codified in
the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (20s)
All fishers as this supports to protect habitats
of marine fish resources
Various lobster fishing regulations (21 s) All lobster fishers as this supports
sustainability of lobster resource base
*These codes refer to the norms and rules in Table 1
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Interactions between state and community institutions
Bavinck et al. (2013) present a typology for the relationships between multiple legal
systems operating in a social field (see Table 3). These authors identify four ideal-
typical relational forms, moving from indifference (type 1), through competition or
conflict (type 2), to accommodation (type 3) and mutual support (type 4). Many of
the community institutions identified in Table 1 are located in Type 1 (indiffer-
ence): the state has no interest in these aspects of fisheries regulation and, if it is
aware of the existence of these community institutions at all, leaves them up to
the community to regulate. A small range of state institutions in Table 1 is in-
cluded in Type 3 (accommodation): here there is evidence of relatively effective
state institutions to which fishers have adjusted themselves. Thus fishers have gen-
erally adapted to state rules of registration and licensing, perhaps also because the
consequences are still limited (government does not yet employ these instruments
for the purpose of limiting fishing effort). Mutual support (type 4) is found in
some cases, such as the ban on turtle fishing. Here we have a state ruling with a
background in conservation ethics, coinciding with a local taboo. Finally there is
the type 2 group of state and community institutions that conflict with one an-
other. These are discussed in the next section.
Conflicting institutions
Table 3 indicates where state and community institutions in the small-scale fisher-
ies of Hambantota District contradict each other, at least in their intentions. A first
set (12) of these are foundational in that they define the right holder – the cat-
egory of persons that is allowed to partake in the act of fishing or landing of the
catch. The state limits this right to those who are registered and licensed by gov-
ernment law, while communities link it to community membership. Not only is it
imaginable that the government could provide fishing and landing rights to those
not recognized by the communities in question; the communities too will not ne-
cessarily accept those given access rights the by government. In practice, however,
such foundational disagreements do not come into play because the government –
at the time of research – was not strictly implementing its rules, nor attaching
consequences to the possession or non-possession of a registration or license. The
government is currently not interfering in communities’ definitions of right holders.
In future, if these foundational differences are expressed more firmly, a comprom-
ise will have to be found.
State and non-state institutions are more seriously at loggerheads where they
prescribe rulings for specific fishing practices. Community institutions thus deny
Table 3 Typology of relationships between legal systems
Quality/Intensity Weak relations Strong relations
Negative Type 1: Indifference (rules 1c, 2c, 3c, 4c,
5c, 7c, 9c, 10c, 11c, 12c, 13c, 14c)
Type 2: Competition/conflict
(rules 12c, 13c, 18 s, 21 s)
Positive Type 3: Accommodation (rules 6c, 8c, 15 s, 16 s) Type 4: Mutual support
(rules 17 s, 19 s, 20s)
Source: adapted from Bavinck et al. 2013
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the possibility of targeting chank (13c), and also proscribe the use of scuba-diving
gear for catching lobster (12c). State institutions on the other hand allow both of
these fishing practices, and implement other kinds of restrictions (time-zoning and
size restrictions) for lobster (21 s.2). These differences are anchored partly in dif-
ferent ecological reasonings. Community fishers believe that chanks play an import-
ant ecological role and can be removed only at the cost of environmental
degradation (and a future decline of fishing). In their view, lobster stocks – if col-
lected only as they entangle themselves in a bottom-set net – are not at risk. If
scuba diving were to be allowed, however, this would result in a complete deple-
tion of the lobster population. State representatives argue, on the other hand, that
scuba diving would allow for a careful selection of mature and un-berried speci-
mens and a more sustainable long-term policy. Community fishers counter that the
use of diving equipment would reserve lobster (and chank) fishing for the rich,
and cause an unwanted concentration of wealth.
The status quo is that fishers do not land lobster during the state-sanctioned
closed seasons, as the government exercises relatively effective control of the mar-
keting chain. Fishers, however, do not allow for scuba-diving in what they see as
their fishing zone and continue to use bottom-set nets in areas known to support
lobster populations. Behind this arrangement lie fundamental disagreements about
fishing practice, conflicts over which could emerge in the future.
Improving relations
We noted in sections 6 and 7 above that the relations between community and
state legal systems can be divided into four types that vary substantially (see
Table 3). In all types, relations suffer from rule incoherence, with conflicts being
most pronounced in type 2. Gupta and Bavinck (2014) argue that rule incoherence
is a substantial problem for policymakers, and requires different responses. In a
similar vein, Jentoft et al. (2009) argue for the implementation of co-management
partnerships that harmonize legal disparities “in a way that is relevant to the man-
agement task at hand and is socially just from the perspective of participant stake-
holders” (2009:35).
Co-management thinking has been very influential in fisheries, particularly with re-
gard to developing countries (Wilson et al. 2003). One of its objectives has been to
bridge the gap between community and state institutions. In terms of the typology pre-
sented above, the goal would then be to move from types 1 and 2 to type 3 and prefera-
bly to type 4. This process would be lengthy, and would rely heavily on institutional
bricolage (Cleaver 2012).
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have tried to fill part of the knowledge-gap with regard to institu-
tions relevant to small-scale fisheries (Kolding et al. 2014), focusing particularly on
southern Sri Lanka. For analytical reasons, we have applied a legal pluralism ap-
proach, distinguishing state from community institutions. In contrast to India,
where non-governmental caste councils often play an important role in fisheries
governance, predating the involvement of the state, these are not present in
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Hambantota District. Instead, “the plural legal pattern of Hambantota is a patina of
beach-level norms and rules intersecting with a relatively more dominant, though
inconsistently effective, national Department of Fisheries” (Bavinck et al. 2013:628).
Our analysis confirms and builds upon this assessment.
We have investigated 21 of the institutions that are of most relevance to small-
scale fisher livelihoods in Hambantota District. These institutions affect the liveli-
hoods of fishers through a variety of mechanisms that reduce conflict and risk,
enhance income and social capital, protect physical and natural assets (the ecosys-
tem and the benthic environment), and define access to natural assets (fishing
grounds and landing centers). They also affect resource conservation through
controlling extraction of fish resources directly and indirectly.
The most effective institutions derive from the communities of fishers them-
selves, with state regulations frequently proving to be ineffective, mainly for rea-
sons of lack of state capacity. Community institutions have important social and
economic functions, whereas state institutions concentrate on environmental goals.
This contrast in emphasis has important implications for fisheries policy in the
country. An understanding of the quality and effectiveness of community institu-
tions may prepare the ground for increased collaboration between state and
community actors.
We also noted, however, relational types between state and community that
vary from indifference to conflict and mutual support. We argued that the type
of relationship that prevails in any specific instance determines institutional ef-
fectiveness with regard to social, economic and environmental goals. The most
problematic are those instances where state and community institutions contra-
dict each other, for example with regard to the use of scuba gear. Conversely,
where state and community institutions are in agreement, such as with regard to
the prohibition of capture of turtles and marine mammals, effectiveness is
greatest.
Our analysis does not provide evidence for the extent to which social, economic
and environmental goals are actually attained. In fact, as Andrew et al. (2007)
point out, small-scale fisheries are often “adversely affected by the broader political,
institutional and economic drivers of global and national economies” (Andrew et al.
2007:228). Competition with external resource users and biophysical influences also play
a significant role. Our analysis does underline the need to view state and community regu-
lation in conjunction.
Endnotes
1This definition of institutions varies from the one preferred by the second au-
thor in his writings in that it ignores the role of ‘a staff of people’ in formulating
and implementing norms and working rules. We have chosen in this paper to
abide by the regular Northian definition, but make reference to institutions’
organizational base where appropriate.
2The skipper is the unit’s decision-maker, in charge of daily operations. In some
cases, such as in non-motorized outrigger fishing, the skipper may be fishing on
his own. Generally he is, however, accompanied by a small crew.
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Appendix
Table 4 Informal contracts for sharing of revenue after reduction of operational costs*
Informal contracts in Kalametiya (n = 64)
Type of gear Type of craft Informal contracts Percentage
of respondents
1. After deducting the operational costs of fishing,
50 % of the value of the catch is allocated to the
craft and gear owner and the other 50 % is for the
crew. (But, if the net return is less than SLR 5000,
1/3 of the net return will be allocated to the owner).
Any damage to gear is borne by owner.
52 %
FRP boat (crew - 2) 2. After deducting the operational costs of fishing,
15 % of the value of the catch is allocated to the
net owner, 33 % of the rest is allocated to the owner
of the craft and engine (for the owner) and the
remaining 66 % is for the crew. Any damage to
gears is borne by owner.
6 %
Gill nets 3. After deducting all the cost incurred in fishing,
10 % of the net revenue is allocated for the net
(gear depreciation) and then 33 % of the rest is
allocated for the craft and engine (for the owner)
and the remaining 66 % for the crew. Any damage




1. 33 % of the value of the catch is for the craft
owner and 66 % is for the crew.
3 %
2. After deducting operational costs, 33 % of the
value of fish catch is reserved for the craft owner
and 66 % is for the crew.
2 %
Lobster nets FRP boat and
traditional craft
(crew- 2 or more)
1. Fishers keep the catches from their own nets,
sharing fuel costs. (no share for the craft)
28 %
2. After deducting operational costs of fishing,
the value of the catch is divided equally among
crew members. Every crew member uses his





(crew- 2 or 3)
1. After deducting all costs for fishing, 33 % of
the value of the catch is for the owner of craft
and gears and 66 % for the crew; any damage
to gear is included in the cost of fishing or




1. After deducting operational costs of fishing,
the value of the catch is divided equally among
crew members. The owner is part of the crew
(no share for the craft).
3 %
Informal contracts in Welipatanwila (n = 21)
Type of gear Type of craft Informal contracts of fishers Percentage of
respondents
1. After deducting the operational costs* of fishing,
50 % of the value of the fish catch is allocated to
the craft and gear owner and the remaining 50 %
is for the crew. Costs of damage to gear are borne
by the owner.
5 %
2. After deducting the operational costs of fishing,
15 % of the value of the catch is allocated to the
net owner; 33 % of the remainder is allocated for
the craft and engine owner. The remaining 66 %
is for the crew. Costs of damage to gears is borne
by the owner.
5 %
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Table 4 Informal contracts for sharing of revenue after reduction of operational costs* (Continued)
FRP boat
(crew-2 or 3)
3. When an owner lends fishers his boat and
engine, the fishers use their nets separately
and share fuel costs, each paying 15 %
of the value of their catch
separately to the boat owner.
5 %
4. When an owner lends a boat and nets (17)
to a fisher who owns an engine and nets (12),
the fisher gives the boat owner the catch of his
17 nets. Then, after deducting all operational costs
from the value of the catch from his 12 nets, 33 %
of the value of the fish catch is allocated to the
owner of the engine and nets while the remaining
66 % is shared with the crew members.
5 %
Gill nets 5. After deducting operational costs, 33 % of the
value of the catch is reserved for craft, engine and
nets and 66 % for crew members if the value of the
catch is more than SLR 1000 (if it is less than SLR
1000 the catch value is equally divided among
the crew members).
10 %
1. After deducting operational costs, 15 % of the
value of the catch is for the craft owner and the
rest is divided equally among crew members.
(requirement: all crew members use the same
number of nets)
5 %
2. Craft owner uses more nets (10) than crew member




3. After deduction of operational costs, 33 % of
the value of the catch is reserved for craft, engine
and nets and 66 % for crew members if the value
of the catch is more than SLR 1000 (if it is less than
SLR 1000 the catch value is equally divided among
the crew members).
14 %
4. Crew members use nets separately and share
all operational costs. Each crew member allocates
33 % of the value of his fish catch to the owner
of the craft and the engine.
19 %
5. Fisher (owner of the craft and engine) uses 8
nets and crew member uses 5 nets. Fuel costs
are shared but catches are kept separate. The
value of the fish catch from the surplus 3 nets
of the owner is used for maintaining the engine.
5 %
Type of gear Type of craft Informal contracts of fishers Percentage of
respondents
Shark net Traditional rowboats
(crew- 2 or 3)
1. After deducting operational costs, 50 %
of the value of the catch is reserved for
the craft and net (rowing craft) and 50 %






(crew – 2 or 3)
1. Crew members (including owner of
the craft) use separate nets and keep
their own catches, sharing fuel costs.
67 %
2. Craft owner uses 5 trammel nets (1 piece
for the engine) and crew members use 4
trammel nets. Crew share fuel costs.
5 %
1. After deducting the operational costs, 33 %
of the catch value is for the owner of the craft
and gear and 66 % for the crew. Any damage
to gear is included in the cost of fishing.
29 %
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